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We demonstrate high-rate randomized data-encryption through optical fibers using the inher-
ent quantum-measurement noise of coherent states of light. Specifically, we demonstrate 650Mbps
data encryption through a 10Gbps data-bearing, in-line amplified 200km-long line. In our proto-
col, legitimate users (who share a short secret-key) communicate using an M -ry signal set while
an attacker (who does not share the secret key) is forced to contend with the fundamental and
irreducible quantum-measurement noise of coherent states. Implementations of our protocol using
both polarization-encoded signal sets as well as polarization-insensitive phase-keyed signal sets are
experimentally and theoretically evaluated. Different from the performance criteria for the cryp-
tographic objective of key generation (quantum key-generation), one possible set of performance
criteria for the cryptographic objective of data encryption is established and carefully considered.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, Data encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than twenty years, physicists and engineers
have investigated quantum-mechanical phenomena as
mechanisms to satisfy certain cryptographic objectives.
Such objectives include user authentication, bit commit-
ment, key generation, and recently, data encryption. To
date, the cryptographic objective most considered in the
literature has been key generation. In key generation,
two users, who initially share a small amount of secret
information, remotely agree on a sequence of bits that is
both larger than their original shared information and is
known only to them. The newly generated bits (keys)
are then used to publicly communicate secret messages
over classical channels by driving data encrypters like
the information-theoretically perfect one-time pad [1] or
more efficient (but less secure) encrypters, such as the
Advanced Encryption Standard, where security is de-
scribed in terms of complexity assumptions [2, 3].
Several approaches to key generation using quantum
effects have been proposed and demonstrated. The most
famous of these protocols, the BB84 protocol [4] and
the Ekert protocol [5] have enjoyed considerable theo-
retical consideration as well as experimental implemen-
tation [6, 7, 8]. A major technical limitation of the BB84
(Ekert) protocol is that the achievable key-generation
rate (more importantly, the rate-distance product) is rel-
atively low due to the protocol’s requirement for single-
photon (entangled-photon) quantum states. This re-
quirement is a burden not only in the generation of such
states, but also in that such states are acutely susceptible
to loss, are not optically amplifiable (in general), and are
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difficult to detect at high rates. Furthermore, because the
received light must be detected at the single-photon level,
integration of the protocol implementations into today’s
wavelength-division-multiplexed (WDM) fiber-optic in-
frastructure is problematic because cross-channel isola-
tion is typically no better than 30dB.
Recently, we have demonstrated a new quantum cryp-
tographic scheme, based on Yuen’s KCQ approach [9], in
which the inherent quantum noise of coherent states of
light is used to perform the cryptographic service of data
encryption [10, 11]. Unlike single-photon states, coher-
ent states (of moderate average-energy level) are easily
generated, easily detected, and are optically amplifiable,
networkable, and loss tolerant. Note that key generation
and data encryption are two different cryptographic ob-
jectives with different sets of criteria by which to judge
performance—a direct comparison between the two is not
appropriate.
In our scheme, legitimate users extend a short, shared
secret-key by using a publicity known deterministic func-
tion. The transmitter uses the extended key to select a
signal set for each transmitted bit such that the legiti-
mate receiver, using the same extended key, is able to
execute a simple binary-decision measurement on each
bit. An eavesdropper, on the other hand, who does not
possess the secret key, is subject to an irreducible quan-
tum uncertainty in each measurement, even with the use
of ideal detectors. This uncertainty results in randomiza-
tion of the eavesdropper’s observations, thereby realizing
a true randomized cipher [12] which effectively limits the
eavesdropper’s ability to decipher the transmitted mes-
sage. This randomization is “free” in that it does not re-
quire any additional action on the part of the transmitter
in contrast to other randomized ciphers [13, 14], where
active randomization of the signal-set is required by the
transmitter. Our scheme, running at data-encryption
rates up to 650Mbps, uses off-the-shelf components and
2is compatible with today’s optical telecommunications
infrastructure. This paper is organized as follows: in
section II we outline our quantum-noise protected data-
encryption protocol (call the αη protocol), in section III
we address issues of security and performance, and in
section IV we summarize our experimental results.
II. DATA ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL
We have implemented two versions of our quantum-
noise protected data-encryption protocol using dif-
ferent signal sets—one using polarization states [11]
(polarization-mode scheme) and the other using phase
states [15, 16] (time-mode scheme). In both implemen-
tations, the fundamental and irreducible measurement
uncertainty of coherent states is the key element giving
security. In the polarization-mode scheme, the two-mode
coherent states employed are
|Ψ(a)m 〉 = |α〉x ⊗ |α eiθm〉y , (1)
|Ψ(b)m 〉 = |α〉x ⊗ |α ei(θm+pi)〉y, (2)
where |α〉 is a coherent state, θm = pim/M , m ∈
{0, 1, 2, ..., (M−1)},M is odd, and the subscripts x and y
indicate the two orthogonal polarization mode-functions.
Viewed on the Poincare´ sphere, these 2M polarization
states form M bases that uniformly span a great circle
as shown in Fig. 1(top). In the time-mode scheme, the
single-mode coherent states employed are
|Ψ(a)m 〉 = |αeiθm〉, (3)
|Ψ(b)m 〉 = |αei(θm+pi)〉, (4)
where again θm = pim/M , m ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., (M − 1)}, and
M is odd. These 2M states form M antipodal-phase
pairs (bases) that uniformly span the phase circle, as
shown in Fig. 1(bottom).
In both schemes, the transmitter (Alice) extends an
s-bit secret key, K, to a (2s − 1)-bit pseudo-random
extended-key, K′, using a publicly known s-bit linear
feedback shift-register [2] (LSFR) of maximal length.
The extended-key is grouped into continuous disjointed
r-bit blocks and then passed through an invertible r-bit–
to–r-bit deterministic mapping function, referred to as
a “mapper,” resulting in running-keys, R, where r =
Int[log2M ] and s ≫ r. The mapper, which is publicly
known, helps to distribute an attacker’s measurement
uncertainty throughout each running-key. Without the
use of a mapper, an attacker’s measurement uncertainty
would, the majority of the time, obscure just a the least-
significant bits of each r-bit running-key thereby leaving
most of the r bits clearly identifiable. Also, note that an
LFSR is just one of many of functions that the users can
use to extend K into K′. The reason LFSRs are used
in these experiments is because they are mathematically
simple to describe which could be useful when quantify-
ing the precise level of security provided by αη.
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FIG. 1: Top: M pairs of orthogonal polarization states uni-
formly span a great circle of the Poincare´ sphere; Bottom: M
pairs of antipodal phase states uniformly span a phase circle.
Depending on the data bit and an instantiation of
the running-key R, one of the states in Eqs. (1) [(3)]
or (2)[(4)] is transmitted where m is the decimal repre-
sentation of R. Specifically, for the polarization-mode
scheme, if m is even then (0, 1) → (|Ψ(a)m 〉, |Ψ(b)m 〉) and
if m is odd then (0, 1) → (|Ψ(b)m 〉, |Ψ(a)m 〉). This re-
sults in the logical bit mapping of the polarization states
on the Poincare´ sphere to be interleaved 0, 1, 0, 1, ..., as
shown in Fig. 1(top). The time-mode scheme is sim-
ilarly organized but slightly more complicated in that
the data bits are defined differentially (differential-phase-
shift keying, DPSK). Specifically, if m is even, then the
DPSK mapping is (0, pi)→ (|Ψ(a)m 〉, |Ψ(b)m 〉), and (0, pi)→
(|Ψ(b)m 〉, |Ψ(a)m 〉) for m odd. If we relabel the states cor-
responding to DPSK phases of “0” and “pi” as µ and
ν, respectively, then logical zero is mapped to |Ψ(µ)m 〉
(|Ψ(ν)m 〉) if the previously transmitted state was from
the set {|Ψ(µ)m 〉} ({|Ψ(ν)m 〉}) and logical one is mapped
to |Ψ(µ)m 〉 (|Ψ(ν)m 〉) if the previously transmitted state was
from the set {|Ψ(ν)m 〉} ({|Ψ(µ)m 〉}). This results in the map-
ping of the symbols on the phase circle to be interleaved
µ, ν, µ, ν, ..., as shown in Fig. 1(bottom).
At the receiving end, the intended receiver (Bob)
uses the same s-bit secret key and LFSR/mapper to
apply unitary transformations to his received quantum
states according to the running-keys. These transforma-
tions correspond to polarization-state rotations for the
polarization-mode scheme, and phase shifts for the time-
mode scheme—in either case the transmittedM -ry signal
3set is reduced to a binary signal-set. The resulting states
under measurement, depending on the logical bit, are
|Ψ(a)〉′ = |ηα〉x ⊗ |ηα〉y , (5)
|Ψ(b)〉′ = |ηα〉x ⊗ | − ηα〉y , (6)
for the polarization-mode scheme and
|Ψ(a)〉′ = |ηα〉, (7)
|Ψ(b)〉′ = | − ηα〉, (8)
for the time mode scheme, where η is the channel trans-
missivity. For both schemes the states are then demodu-
lated and differentially detected. Specifically, a fixed pi/4
polarization rotation on the states in the polarization-
mode scheme results in the detected states
|Ψ˜(a)〉 = |
√
2ηα〉x ⊗ |0〉y, (9)
|Ψ˜(b)〉 = |0〉x ⊗ |
√
2ηα〉y , (10)
whereas temporally-asymmetric interferometry in the
time-mode implementation results in the detected states
|Ψ˜(a)〉 = |ηα〉1 ⊗ |0〉2, (11)
|Ψ˜(b)〉 = |0〉1 ⊗ |ηα〉2. (12)
An important feature to note is that Bob does not re-
quire high precision in applying decryption transforma-
tions to a transmitted bit. While the application of a
slightly incorrect polarization/phase transformation re-
sults in a larger probability of error for the bit, it does
not categorically render a bit to be in error. For small
perturbations to the polarization/phase rotation, the ma-
jority of the signal energy stays in one of the two detec-
tion modes. The same applies to Bob’s detector noise;
while an ideal detector allows for optimized performance,
a noisy detector does not limit Bob’s decryption ability
beyond an increased probability of bit error.
A high-level block diagram of the αη protocol is pro-
vided in Fig. 2. Note that some elements of our pro-
tocol that help to protect the secret key against attack
have been intentionally omitted from this description for
the purpose of clarity. These omitted elements are men-
tioned in the following section and are further described
in Ref. [9].
III. SECURITY
As stated in the introduction, key generation and
data encryption are different cryptographic objectives
and, therefore, have different sets of criteria by which
to evaluate performance. The delineation between key
generation and data encryption is somewhat confused
by terminology. Because keys procured by a key-
generation protocol are usually assumed to drive deter-
ministic encrypters, the terms “quantum key-generation”
and “quantum data-encryption” are sometimes used in-
terchangeably. This easily leads to confusion in that (a)
there are potential uses for the generated keys beyond
data encryption, and (b) there are methods of realizing
quantum-based data-encryption without key generation.
In quantum key-generation, a necessary (but not suf-
ficient) condition that must be satisfied is
H(X|YE,K)−H(X|YB,K)−H(K) > 0, (13)
where X is a classical n-bit random vector describing
the transmitted bits, YE and YB are n-bit vectors de-
scribing the observations of an attacker (Eve) and Bob,
respectively; K is an s-bit, previously shared secret be-
tween Alice and Bob that might become public on com-
pletion of the protocol, and H(·) is the Shannon entropy
function. Note that while often omitted in descriptions
of the BB84 and Ekert protocols, both schemes require
a secret key K for the purpose of message authentica-
tion. Also note that the H(K) term in Eq. (13) may be
omitted if both a) information about K is never publicly
announced, and b) K remains secret even when under a
general attack (as in some of Yuen’s KCQ key-generation
protocols).
The mathematical definition of H(X|Y), to be read as
“the uncertainty of X given Y,” is given by
H(X|Y) ≡ −
∑
x,y
p(X = x,Y = y)
× log p(X = x|Y = y), (14)
which, with application of Bayes’ theorem and the Law
of Total Probability, becomes
H(X|Y) = −
∑
x,y
p(X = x)p(Y = y|X = x)
× log
[
p(X = x)p(Y = y|X = x)∑
x′ p(X = x
′)p(Y = y|X = x′)
]
.
(15)
The conditional probability distribution p(Y|X) is com-
pletely and uniquely specified by the probability distribu-
tion of the secret key p(K), the probability distribution of
the plaintext message p(X), and the encryption function
that takes X to Y = EK(X). While EK(X) is usually
assumed known to the attacker via the Kerckhoff assump-
tion, it is important to emphasize that the calculation of
H(X|Y) also depends on the probability distributions
p(K) and p(X) according to Eve. This means that Eve’s
conditional entropy H(X|Y) may change if Eve’s proba-
bility distribution p(X) changes due to the acquisition of
some side-information (such as the language of the plain-
text message).
For the cryptographic objective of data encryption, be
it classical or quantum-noise–protected, some relevant
information-theoretic quantities are:
i) H(X|YB,K), (16)
ii) H(X|YE), (17)
iii) H(K|YE), (18)
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FIG. 2: Summary of the quantum-noise protected data encryption protocol. In our experiments, the “pseudo-random key-
extender” is implemented by a maximal-length LFSR and “r-bit–to–r-bit mapping function”.
where X is the n-bit transmitted message (plaintext),
YB and YE are Bob’s and Eve’s n-bit observations of
the encrypted plaintext (ciphertext), and K is the s-bit
secret key shared by the legitimate users. In words, these
quantities describe i) the error rate for the legitimate
users, ii) the secrecy of the data bits when under attack,
and iii) the secrecy of the secret key when under attack.
When launched on either the data bits or the se-
cret key, cryptographic attacks are normally divided
into two categories, known-plaintext (KPT) attacks and
ciphertext-only (CTO) attacks. CTO attacks correspond
to situations where p(X) is uniform, according to the
attacker. In other words, all 2n possible messages are
transmitted with equal probability. A KPT attack corre-
sponds to all situations where p(X) is nonuniform includ-
ing the totally degenerate deterministic case of chosen-
plaintext. Some example KPT attacks include knowledge
of the native language of the message or perhaps some
statistical knowledge of the message content. While there
are clearly varying degrees of KPT attacks, a CTO attack
refers to the specific case of uniform p(X).
According to information theory [17, 18], Eqs. (17) and
(18) satisfy the following inequalities:
H(X|YE) ≤ H(K), (19)
H(K|YE) ≤ H(K), (20)
where Eq. (19) is known as the Shannon limit [19] which
is valid whenH(X|YE,K) = 0 (our data-encryption pro-
tocol operates in a regime where H(X|YE,K) ∼= 0[23]).
Note that in αη, contrary to the case for key generation
[cf. Eq. (13)], the conditionH(X|YE,K) > H(X|YB,K)
need not be satisfied. In fact the opposite is normally
true where an attacker (given the secret key after mea-
surement) has a lower bit-error rate than the legitimate
receiver. This is the case when a significant amount of
loss and/or additive noise exists between the two users
where it is assumed that the attacker, performing an ad-
equate quantum measurement, is located near the trans-
mitter.
The one-time pad encrypter achieves what Shannon
called “perfect security” which corresponds to = H(X)
in the inequality of Eq. (19) when s = n. The practical
problem with the one-time pad is that every data bit to
be encrypted requires one bit of key. More “efficient,” al-
beit less secure, encrypters operate in the regime where
s ≪ n < ∞, thereby allowing short secret-keys to en-
crypt long messages. A reasonable information-theoretic
goal of such “imperfect but efficient” encrypters (practi-
cal encrypters) could be to show
H(X|YB,K)→ 0, (21)
H(X|YE) = λ1 ·H(K), (22)
H(K|YE) = λ2 ·H(K), (23)
where s ≪ n < ∞ and λ1,2 → 1. It is extremely impor-
tant to emphasize that even if λ1, λ2 → 0, there still may
exist a large complexity-based problem of finding the cor-
rect x even when given yE, p(X), p(K), and EK(X)—it
is in this complexity-based limit in which all of today’s
commercial deterministic encrypters are considered.
According to the given information-theoretic criteria,
a goal of practical data encrypters could be to a) drive
λ1,2 as close to 1 as possible for a reasonably large s while
still keeping s ≪ n < ∞; b) attempt to mathematically
prove Eqs. (22) and (23); and c) if conditions (a) and (b)
cannot be met, insure that the computational (search)
complexity is high even when λ1,2 ·H(K) = 0. To date,
no practical data encrypter exists for which Eqs. (22)
and (23) can be rigorously proven, for nontrivial λ, when
under a KPT attack; no significant complexity-based se-
curity has been proven either.
Note that the appropriate information-theoretic crite-
ria by which to quantify the security of a data encrypter
may be different for different sociological situations. For
example, satisfying the criteria given in Eqs. (22) and
(23) (λ1,2 = 1) may yield security in some situations, but
not in others. A different set of operationally-meaningful
criteria for the cryptographic objective of data encryp-
tion, which does not rely on Shannon entropy, has been
described in Ref. [9].
Towards the goal of satisfying the cryptographic ob-
jective of data encryption, according to any reasonable
information-theory–based criteria, we offer a new ap-
proach to data-encryption wherein the irreducible uncer-
tainty inherent in the quantum measurement of coherent
5states of light is used to perform high-speed randomized
encryption that does not sacrifice the data rate. In our
protocol (section II), the logical mappings of the sym-
bols are interleaved (Fig. 1). While the users (who share
a short secret-key) are able to make simple binary deci-
sions on the M -ry signal set, an attacker (who does not
share the secret key) is left with an irreducible uncer-
tainty in her measurements due to the quantum fluctu-
ations inherent to coherent states of light. Specifically,
with M and |α|2 in a particular regime, measurements
of neighboring states, on either the Poincare´ sphere or
the phase circle, overlap and obscure one another. To an
attacker, this overlap is equivalent to Alice broadcasting
digital representations of the M -ry signal that are then
actively randomized over the signal’s closest neighbors in
the signal constellation. By using coherent states with
a relatively weak amplitude, a similar randomization is
achieved through quantum-measurement noise which re-
quires no active effort on the part of the transmitter,
but still obscures the true identity of the state called for
by the protocol. Such randomization is realized through
any quantum measurement including direct detection,
balanced homodyne/heterodyne detection, and optimal
quantum-phase detection.
Given some restrictive assumptions, one can even de-
scribe the performance of a quantum-mechanically op-
timal attack—the best attack allowed by quantum me-
chanics. While the physical structure of such an optimal
attack may be unknown, quantum mechanics can estab-
lish bounds on the maximum information rate of an at-
tacker. For individual attacks on the message where clas-
sical correlations are ignored, the quantum-mechanically
optimal attack—known as the optimal positive operator-
valued measure—corresponds to optimally distinguish-
ing all of the states mapped to logical one from those
mapped to logical zero. Figure 3 plots the information
rate of the optimal positive operator-valued measure as
a function of |α|2 and M for the time- and polarization-
mode implementations where information [17] is defined
as 1 + P¯e log2(P¯e) + (1 − P¯e) log2(1 − P¯e) for a bit-error
rate P¯e.
Figure 3 also plots the information rate of the described
attack when performing an ideal heterodyne measure-
ment. The performance of this measurement is included
because it represents the “highest performing” receiver
structure that an attacker could practically implement
using today’s technology. The difference between the in-
formation rates of the time- and polarization-mode im-
plementations, for both the optimal positive operator-
valued measure and ideal heterodyne attacks, is due to
the fact that logical bits are defined differentially across
two modes in the time-mode scheme—a bit is correctly
determined if and only if two consecutive state measure-
ments are both correct or both incorrect. It is important
to remember that both the optimal positive operator-
valued measure and ideal heterodyne analyses are for a
very limited attack where Eve does not use her infor-
mation on the correlations between the running-keys to
determine the plaintext or secret key—a real attacker
would presumably use all information at her disposal.
While the inability to distinguish neighboring states
plays a role in protecting the secret key against at-
tacks, additional mechanisms are required to improve
the secrecy of the secret key. By introducing deliber-
ate state-randomization at the transmitter, perfect secu-
rity against CTO attacks on the secret key [H(K|YE) =
H(K), uniform p(X)] can be assured as well as strongly-
ideal security against CTO attacks on the message
[H(X|YE) = H(K), uniform p(X)]. More information
on deliberate state-randomization is available in Ref. [9].
Note that the mapper and deliberate state-randomization
have not yet been implemented in our published experi-
mental realizations.
Physical “trojan horse” attacks can also be launched
on the message and the secret key by attempting to probe
Alice’s transmitter settings. In such an attack, an eaves-
dropper would send strong light into Alice’s transmitter
and measure the state of her reflected light. Attacks of
this type can be passively thwarted by using an optical
isolator at the output of Alice’s transmitter.
Confusion over the cryptographic service that our pro-
tocol (αη) offers as well as how quantum noise is exploited
in our scheme prompted a criticism [20] to Ref. [10]
and some of the authors of Ref. [10] have replied [21].
In Ref. [22], it is claimed that the αη data-encryption
protocol, operating in a regime where H(X|YE,K) <
H(X|YB,K), already permits key generation. We dis-
agree with that conclusion.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Using both the polarization- and time-mode imple-
mentations, we demonstrate high-speed quantum-noise–
protected data encryption. The primary objective of
these experiments is to successfully demonstrate quan-
tum data encryption through a realistic classical-data
bearing WDM fiber line. A secondary objective is to
show that the quantum-noise encrypted signal does not
negatively impact the performance of the classical data-
bearing channels. The following two subsections sum-
marize the physical setups as well as the experimental
results for both implementations.
A. Polarization-mode implementation
A description of the polarization-mode experimental
setup naturally breaks into two parts: the quantum-
noise–protected data-encryption transmitter/receiver
pair and the WDM fiber line (which also carries clas-
sical data traffic) over which the encrypted data trav-
els. We first describe the transmitter/receiver pair. As
illustrated in Fig. 4(left), a polarization-control-paddle
(PCP) is adjusted to project the light from a 1550.1nm-
wavelength distributed-feedback (DFB) laser equally into
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the two polarization modes of Alice’s 10GHz-bandwidth
fiber-coupled LiNbO3 phase modulator (PM). Driven by
the amplified output of a 12-bit digital-to-analog (D-A)
board, the modulator introduces a relative phase (0 to
2pi radians) between the two polarization modes. A soft-
ware LFSR, which is implemented on a personal com-
puter (PC), yields a running-key that, when combined
with the data bit, instructs the generation of one of the
two states described in Eqs. (1) and (2). Due to elec-
tronic bandwidth limitations of some amplifiers, Manch-
ester coding is applied on top of the signal set that results
in a factor of two reduction of the data rate (250Mbps)
relative to the line rate (500Mbps). Note that in the
time-mode implementation, described in Sec. IVB, such
Manchester coding is not required due to the use of wider
bandwidth amplifiers.
On passing through the 100km-long WDM fiber line
[shown in Fig. 4(right), Crypto. in and Crypto. out ],
the received light is amplified by a home-built erbium-
doped–fiber amplifier (EDFA) with ≃ 30dB of small-
signal gain and a noise figure very close to the quantum
limit (NF ≃ 3dB). Before passing through Bob’s PM,
the received light is sent through a second PCP to can-
cel out the unwanted polarization rotation that occurs in
the 100km-long fiber line. While these rotations fluctu-
ate with a bandwidth on the order of kilohertz, the mag-
nitude of the fluctuations drops quickly with frequency,
allowing the use of a manual PCP to track out such un-
wanted polarization rotations. In future implementations
Bob’s measurements could be used to drive an automated
feedback control on the PCP.
The relative phase shift (polarization rotation) intro-
duced by Bob’s modulator is determined by the running-
key R generated through a software LFSR in Bob’s PC
and applied via the amplified output of a second D-A
board. After this phase shift has been applied, the rela-
tive phase between the two polarization modes is 0 or pi,
corresponding to a 0 or 1 according to the running-key:
if R is even then (0, pi) → (0, 1) and if R is odd then
(0, pi) → (1, 0). With use of a fiber-coupled polarization
beam splitter (FPBS) oriented at pi/4 radians with re-
spect to the modulator’s principal axes, the state under
measurement [Eq. (9) or (10)] is direct-detected by using
two 1GHz-bandwidth InGaAs PIN photodiodes operat-
ing at room temperature, one for each of the two polar-
ization modes. The resulting photocurrents are amplified
by a 40dB-gain amplifier, sampled by an analog-to-digital
(A-D) board, and stored for analysis. The overall sensi-
tivity of Bob’s preamplified receiver is measured to be
660 photons/bit for 10−9 error probability.
As shown in Fig. 4(right), the 100km-long WDM
line consists of two 40-channel 100GHz-spacing arrayed-
waveguide gratings (AWGs), two 50km spools of single-
mode fiber (Corning, SMF-28), and an in-line EDFA
with an output isolator. Along with the quantum-noise
protected 0.25Gbps encrypted-data channel, two 10Gbps
channels of classical data traffic also propagate through
the described WDM line. Light from two DFB lasers on
the 100GHz ITU grid (1546.9nm and 1553.3nm) is mixed
on a 3dB coupler, where one output is terminated and
the other enters a 10GHz-bandwidth fiber-coupled Mach-
Zender type LiNbO3 intensity modulator (IM). The IM
is driven by an amplified 10Gbps pseudo-random bit
sequence (PRBS) generated by a pattern generator of
(231−1) period. The PRBS modulated-channels (here-
after referred to as PRBS channels) then pass through
an EDFA to compensate for losses before entering, and
being spectrally separated by AWG1. By introducing ap-
proximately one meter fiber length difference between the
separated PRBS channels before combining them into the
100km-long WDM line with AWG2, the bit sequences of
the two channels are shifted by 50 bits. This shift reduces
temporal correlations between the two PRBS channels,
thereby more effectively simulating random, real-world
data traffic. The 100km-long WDM line is loss compen-
sated by an in-line EDFA. The 10dB power loss in the
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FIG. 4: Left, transmitter/receiver setup: G1, RF power amplifier; OA1, low-noise EDFA followed by a Bragg-grating filter;
G2, RF signal amplifier. Right, WDM network setup: OA1, low-noise EDFA; G3, IM driver; OA2, in-line EDFA followed by
an optical isolator; OA3, EDFA.
first 50km spool of fiber (0.2dB/km loss) is compensated
by 10dB of saturated gain from the in-line EDFA. The
overall loss of the line is therefore 15dB, where 10dB come
from the second 50km spool of fiber and the remaining
5dB from the two AWGs (2.5dB each).
After propagating through the WDM line the chan-
nels are separated by AWG3. Either of the two PRBS
channels is amplified with a 20dB gain EDFA (OA3) and
the group-velocity-dispersion (GVD) is compensated by
a −1530ps/nm dispersion-compensation module (DCM).
While the GVD introduced in the WDM line is ap-
proximately 1700ps/nm, the DCM used is sufficient for
our demonstration. The amplified, GVD-compensated
PRBS channel is detected using an InGaAs PIN-TIA re-
ceiver (RCVR) and analyzed for errors by a 10Gbps bit-
error-rate tester (BERT). Bit-error rates for each PRBS
channel are measured separately using the BERT.
Figure 5(a)(left) shows the optical spectrum of the
light after AWG2 measured with 0.01nm resolution band-
width. The launch powers in the quantum channel and
in each of the PRBS channels are −25dBm and 2dBm,
respectively. An eye pattern of the 1546.9nmPRBS chan-
nel at launch is shown in Fig. 5(a)(right). Measuring af-
ter AWG2 (i.e., at launch), neither PRBS channel showed
any error in 10 terabits of pseudo-random data commu-
nicated. Figure 5(b)(left) shows the optical spectrum
(0.01nm resolution bandwidth) of the light received af-
ter the second 50km spool of fiber. This figure clearly
shows the 10dB loss in signal power of all the channels
and the accompanying 10dB increase in the amplified-
spontaneous-emission dominated noise floor. An eye pat-
tern of the 1546.9nm PRBS channel, post dispersion com-
pensation, is shown in Fig. 5(b)(right). While the effect
of the residual GVD is clearly visible in the eye pattern,
the bit-error rate for each of the PRBS channels remains
nearly “error free” at 5 × 10−11. Neither the bit-error
rates nor the eye patterns of the PRBS channels change
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FIG. 5: (a): Optical spectrum (left) and eye pattern (right) of
a PRBS channel at launch [after AWG2 in Fig. 4(right)]. (b):
Optical spectrum (left) and eye pattern (right) of a PRBS
channel at the end of the line [before AWG3 in Fig. 4(right)].
when the quantum channel is turned off.
Figure 6 shows results of 5000 A-D measurements (one
of the two detector outputs) of a 9.1Mb bitmap file trans-
mitted on the encrypted channel from Alice to Bob (top)
and to Eve (bottom) through the 100km-long WDM line
at 250Mbps data rate. The insets show the respective
decoded images. In this experiment, actions of Eve are
physically simulated by Bob starting with an incorrect
secret-key. Clearly, a real eavesdropper would aim to
make better measurements by placing herself close to Al-
ice and implementing a more optimized quantum mea-
surement. While Fig. 6 does not explicitly demonstrate
Eve’s inability to distinguish logical ones from zeros, it
does, show that a simple bit decision is impossible. In the
current setup, the 12-bit D-A conversion allows Alice to
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FIG. 6: 5-kbit segments of 9.1-Mbit transmissions through
the WDM link. Insets, the received bit-map images. Top,
Bob’s detection; bottom, Eve’s detection.
generate and transmit 4094 distinct polarization states
(M = 2047 bases). The numerical calculation used to
plot Fig. 3(right) then shows that for −25dBm launch
power at 250Mbps (500Mbps line rate, |α|2 ≈ 20, 000)
and M = 2047, Eve’s maximum obtainable information
in an individual attack on the message is less than 10−14
bits/bit.
B. Time-mode implementation
While technically possible, as demonstrated above, the
polarization-state alignment required at the receiver by
the polarization-mode scheme makes it much less attrac-
tive than a polarization-insensitive version with equiva-
lent performance. The time-mode implementation is to-
tally polarization-state insensitive and is therefore much
more desirable for performing quantum-noise–protected
data encryption over real-world WDM networks.
As with the polarization-mode implementation, a de-
scription of the time-mode experimental setup naturally
breaks into two parts: the transmitter/receiver pair and
the WDM fiber line. We first describe the transmit-
ter/receiver pair. As illustrated in Fig. 7(left), −25dBm
of power from a 1550.9nm-wavelength DFB laser is pro-
jected into Alice’s 10GHz-bandwidth fiber-coupled PM.
Driven by the amplified output of a 12-bit D-A board,
the modulator introduces a relative phase (0 to 2pi radi-
ans) between temporally neighboring symbols. A 4.4-kb
software LFSR, which is implemented on a PC, yields a
running-key that, when combined with the data bit, in-
structs the generation of one of the two states described
in Eqs. (3) and (4) at a 650Mbps data rate. Before leav-
ing the transmitter, the encrypted signal is amplified with
an EDFA (OA1) to a saturated output power of 2dBm.
On passing through the 200km-long WDM line [shown
in Fig. 7(right), Crypto. in and Crypto. out), the
received light is amplified by another EDFA (OA2)
with ≃ 30dB of small-signal gain and a noise figure
very close to the quantum limit (NF ≃ 3dB). The
light then passes through a pair of 10GHz-bandwidth
polarization-maintaining-fiber-coupled PMs oriented or-
thogonally with respect to each other so that the xˆ (yˆ)
polarization mode of the first modulator projects onto
the yˆ (xˆ) mode of the second modulator. The effect of
such concatenation is to apply an optical phase modula-
tion that is independent of the polarization state of the
incoming light. The relative phase shift introduced by
Bob’s modulator pair is determined by the running-key
R generated through a software LFSR in Bob’s PC and
applied via the amplified output of a second D-A board.
After this phase shift has been applied, the relative phase
between temporally neighboring states is 0 or pi (differ-
ential phase-shift keying), differentially corresponding to
a 0 or 1.
The decrypted signal then passes through a fiber-
coupled optical circulator and into a temporally asym-
metric Michelson interferometer with one bit-period
round-trip path-length delay between the two arms. Use
of Faraday mirrors (FM) in the Michelson interferome-
ter ensures good polarization-state overlap at the output,
yielding high visibility interference. The interferometer
is path length stabilized with a PZT and dither-lock cir-
cuit.
Light from the two outputs of the interferometer is
direct-detected by using two room temperature 1GHz-
bandwidth InGaAs PIN photodiodes set up in a dif-
ference photocurrent configuration. The resulting pho-
tocurrent is either sampled by an A-D board and stored
for analysis, or put onto a communications signal ana-
lyzer (CSA) to observe eye patterns.
As shown in Fig. 7(right), the 200km-long WDM line
consists of two 100GHz-spacing AWGs, two 100km spools
of single-mode fiber (Corning, SMF-28) and an in-line
EDFA with an input isolator. Along with the quantum-
noise protected 650Mbps encrypted-data channel, two
10Gbps channels of classical data traffic also propagate
through the first 100km of the described WDM line.
Light from two DFB lasers with wavelengths on the
100GHz ITU grid (1550.1nm and 1551.7nm) is mixed
on a 3dB coupler, where one output is terminated and
the other enters a 10GHz-bandwidth fiber-coupled Mach-
Zender type LiNbO3 intensity modulator (IM). The IM is
driven by an amplified 10Gbps PRBS generated by a bit-
error-rate tester (BERT) of (231−1) period. The PRBS-
modulated channels (hereafter referred to as PRBS chan-
nels) then pass through an EDFA to compensate for
losses before entering and being spectrally separated
by AWG1. Partial decorrelation of the PRBS chan-
nels is achieved by introducing approximately one me-
ter fiber length difference (≃ 50 bits) between the chan-
nels before combining them into the WDM line with
9Alice
Bob
PM(PMF)
PC
D-A G1
DFB
D-A
G1
Optical
network
PMPM
(PMF)
pi/2
OA2
3dB
PIN
Circ.3dB
FM
FM
τ
PC
A-D
To
CSA
PZT
OA1
IMDFBs
10Gb/s
BERT
AWG2AWG3 100km
100km
EDFA
EDFA AWG1PCP
PCP
3dB
EDFA
DCM RCVR
G2
1m
Crypto. inCrypto. out
FIG. 7: Left: Transmitter/receiver setup. G1, RF power amplifier; OA2, low-noise EDFA followed by a 25GHz-passband
Bragg-grating filter; PMF, polarization-maintaining fiber; Circ., optical circulator. Right: 200km in-line amplified line. IM,
10Gbps intensity modulator; DCM, dispersion-compensation module; RCVR, 10Gbps InGaAs PIN-TIA optical receiver; G2,
10Gbps modulator driver
AWG2. On launch (i.e., after AWG2), the optical power
is −2dBm/channel for all three channels.
After propagating through the first 100km of fiber
(20dB of loss) and the in-line EDFA (23dB of gain),
the channels are separated by AWG3 (3dB of loss). Ei-
ther of the two PRBS channels is amplified with a 10dB
gain EDFA and the GVD is partially compensated by
a −1530ps/nm DCM. The amplified, GVD-compensated
PRBS channel is detected using an InGaAs PIN-TIA re-
ceiver (RCVR) and analyzed for errors by the BERT.
Note that the reason that the PRBS channels do not
propagate through the entire 200km line is because our
DCM only provides enough compensation for 100km of
fiber. Figure 8(a)(left) shows the optical spectrum of
the light measured after AWG2 with 0.01nm resolution
bandwidth. The launch power in the quantum chan-
nel and in each of the PRBS channels is −1.5dBm. An
eye pattern of the 1550.1nm PRBS channel at launch is
shown in Fig. 8(a)(right). Measuring after AWG2 (i.e., at
launch), neither PRBS channel showed any errors in 10
terabits of pseudo-random data communicated. Figure
8(b)(left) shows the optical spectrum (0.01nm resolution
bandwidth) of the light received after the in-line ampli-
fier (100km of fiber). An eye pattern of the 1550.1nm
PRBS channel, post dispersion compensation, is shown in
Fig. 8(b)(right). As in the polarization-mode implemen-
tation, the bit-error rate for each of the PRBS channels
remained nearly “error free” at 5× 10−11 despite the in-
complete GVD compensation. Neither the bit-error rates
nor the eye patterns of the PRBS channels changed when
the quantum channel was turned off.
Figure 9 shows the eye patterns for encrypted 650Mbps
(215 − 1)-bit-PRBS and 1Mb-bitmap-file transmissions
(insets) as measured by Bob (top) and Eve (bottom).
In these experiments, Bob is located at the end of the
200km-long line and Eve is located at the transmitter
(Alice). Eve’s actions are physically simulated by using
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FIG. 8: (a): Optical spectrum (left) and eye pattern of a
PRBS channel (right) at launch [after AWG2 in Fig. 7(right)].
(b): Optical spectrum (left) and eye pattern of a PRBS
channel (right) after in-line amplification [before AWG3 in
Fig. 7(right)].
Bob’s hardware, but starting with an incorrect secret-
key. While Fig. 9(bottom) does not explicitly demon-
strate Eve’s inability to distinguish neighboring coherent
states on the phase circle, it does, however, show that a
simple bit decision is impossible. The Q-factor for Bob’s
eye pattern, as measured on the CSA, was 12.3.
In all of the time-mode implementation experiments,
the coherent states are transmitted using non-return-to-
zero (NRZ) format. The return-to-zero-like appearance
of Bob’s eye pattern is due to non-zero rise time of the
optical phase modulation. This phenomena is also ob-
served in traditional NRZ-DPSK systems. The apparent
banding of Eve’s measurements at the top and bottom
of the eye pattern is due to the sinusoidal transfer func-
tion of the temporally asymmetric interferometer used for
10
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FIG. 9: Top: Eye pattern and histogram of Bob’s decrypted
signal after 200km propagation in the WDM line. Bottom:
Eye pattern and histogram of Eve’s measurements at the
transmitter. Insets, received 1Mb bitmap file transmissions.
demodulation. Despite this apparent banding, the eaves-
dropper’s probability of error is equal for every transmit-
ted bit. If an eavesdropper were to, say, perform optical
heterodyne detection, a uniform distribution of phases
would be observed.
In the current setup, the 12-bit D-A conversion al-
lows Alice to generate and transmit 4094 distinct phase
states (M = 2047 bases). Although we simulate an eaves-
dropper by placing Bob’s equipment at the transmitter,
a real eavesdropper would aim to make the best mea-
surements allowed by quantum mechanics (just as in the
polarization-mode implementation). The numerical cal-
culation used to plot Fig. 3(left) shows that for −25dBm
signal power at 650Mbps (≈ 40, 000 photons/bit) with
M = 2047, Eve’s maximum obtainable information in
an individual attack on the message would be less than
10−15 bits/bit.
V. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
In summary, we have developed schemes towards
the cryptographic objective of practical data encryp-
tion by using the fundamental and irreducible quantum-
measurement uncertainty of coherent states. Unlike cur-
rently deployed deterministic encrypters whose security
relies solely on unproven computational complexity, we
offer a new quantum-mechanical vehicle to quantifiable
information-theoretic security through high-speed ran-
domized encryption. Furthermore, we have clearly speci-
fied a set of security criteria for the cryptographic service
of data encryption (which are different from those for
key generation) and considered some optimal quantum
attacks on our scheme. While we have yet to explicitly
determine the level of information-theoretic security pro-
vided by our scheme under a general attack (which may
correspond to finding λ1, λ2), our scheme does provide a
physical layer of quantum-noise randomization that can
only enhance the security of a message already encrypted
with a traditional deterministic cipher.
Experimentally, we have implemented and demon-
strated two high-speed versions of the αη data-encryption
protocol using both polarization and time modes, and
evaluated the schemes’ performances through active
WDM lines. Whereas the polarization-mode experiments
have demonstrated the efficacy of the data-encryption
protocol, the polarization independent time-mode exper-
iments have demonstrated a technology that is “drop-in”
compatible with the existing optical telecommunications
infrastructure.
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